ROGERS, Circuit Judge.
Rejon Taylor appeals his convictions and death sentence for carjacking resulting in death, kidnapping resulting in death, and using a firearm to commit murder while committing carjacking and kidnapping. His appeal raises fifteen issues, none of which warrants reversal or remand.
The district court described the crimes underlying this case as follows:
At gunpoint, Luck was forced outside his house and into his van. [Taylor] got in the driver's seat, while Matthews guarded Luck in the back. [Taylor] and Matthews each had a gun. [Taylor] drove the van onto Interstate 75 and traveled north from Atlanta. They made a brief stop at a gas station in north Georgia before eventually crossing into southeast Tennessee, where [Taylor] exited the expressway and drove into the Chattanooga suburb of Collegedale. During the trip, Marshall followed behind in a car registered to [Taylor's] mother.
As [Taylor] drove the van around relatively isolated roads in Collegedale, there was a confrontation in the back of the van, in which Matthews fired a shot, which hit Luck in the arm. [Taylor] turned around from the driver's seat and fired three shots at Luck. The third bullet hit Luck in the mouth and caused his death later that day at Erlanger Hospital. [Taylor] and Matthews left their guns in the van and walked briskly from the van to the car driven by Marshall. They then drove back to Atlanta.
[Taylor] was subsequently arrested and incarcerated pre-trial at the Hamilton County Jail in Chattanooga. While incarcerated there, [he] was part of a group of inmates that attempted to escape.
United States v. Taylor, 583 F.Supp.2d 923, 926-27 (E.D.Tenn.2008).
A jury convicted Taylor of carjacking resulting in death, kidnapping resulting in death, and using a firearm to commit murder while committing carjacking and kidnapping. The jury recommended a death sentence, which the district court imposed. The question in this case is whether particular acts or omissions in the course of Taylor's trial require remand. Taylor has identified fifteen potential grounds for reversal or remand.
Taylor first argues that the district court should have more strenuously questioned Juror 1 (later determined to be the foreperson) to determine whether exposure to an out-of-court remark affected her ability to be impartial. Taylor claims that the district court's failure to do so—or to replace Juror 1 with an alternate juror—requires remand for resentencing. While it might well have been advisable for the district court to ask more questions of Juror 1, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to press on with the questioning once the district court satisfied
The jury found Taylor guilty on September 8, 2008. Just over a week later, on the eve of the sentencing hearing, the Government announced its intention to use at the hearing recordings of phone calls Taylor made from jail after the verdict. In one of those calls, the Government indicated, Taylor allegedly referred to the jurors as "racist rednecks."
The district court questioned Juror 1 as follows:
After reviewing the jurors' and alternates' responses, Taylor moved for a mistrial due to incurable juror prejudice. In the alternative, Taylor requested a hearing during which counsel could question the jurors and alternates and after which the district court could decide whether to dismiss the entire jury or remove the most "taint[ed]" jurors. The district court heard argument on Taylor's requests and ultimately denied them both. Noting "the obvious risk" of reinforcing the allegedly prejudicial publicity by further questioning jurors and alternates about it, the district court observed that a simple stipulation—that Taylor "never said [racist rednecks]"—could resolve the issue without running the risk of further juror prejudice. In a memorandum and order elaborating on its ruling, the district court stated:
"Based upon its interviews with jurors," the district court concluded, it was "confident that the verdict . . . will not be based on emotion." The district court further stated that Taylor's request for a hearing to investigate potential juror prejudice had been satisfied by the district court's juror interviews, "especially given that defense counsel proposed the arrangement." The court also reasoned that further questioning of the jurors "would obviously be detrimental to [Taylor]" because it "could bring the comments to the forefront of jurors' minds and cause jurors to connect the statements to [Taylor]." Taylor appeals the district court's decision, but only with respect to Juror 1.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to ask Juror 1 explicitly about bias resulting from her exposure to Taylor's "redneck" remark, although an explicit question certainly would have been preferable. When a juror is exposed to unauthorized communications involving a case, the district court must "determine the circumstances [of the communications], the impact [of the communications] upon the juror, and whether or not [the communications were] prejudicial." Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). The district court retains considerable discretion in deciding how to conduct such an inquiry, which our decisions have labeled a "Remmer hearing." See Mays v. Chandler, 342 Fed.Appx. 159, 166-67 (6th Cir.2009). This discretion serves at least two important functions. First, it recognizes that district courts are uniquely qualified to ascertain the communication's effect on the jurors and to determine the procedures that should be employed to deal with it. See, e.g., Evans v. Young, 854 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Almonte, 594 F.2d 261, 266 (1st Cir.1979). Second, some degree of discretion is the only alternative to the sort of bright-line rule—for example, one requiring district courts to explicitly inquire whether a juror was prejudiced by a particular communication whenever that juror is found to have been exposed to the communication—that might actually exacerbate juror bias by "unnecessarily highlight[ing] the [communication] in the eyes of the jurors." United States v. Mack, 729 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir.2013).
Upon learning that Taylor's remark had been publicized, the district court asked every juror and every alternate about his or her exposure to Taylor's remarks. The district court asked each juror and alternate who reported a direct familiarity with the remark whether he or she could remain impartial as a juror. Juror 1 had not heard about the remark directly; she knew about it only because some friends of hers had joked that they had not known she was a redneck. She drew certain inferences from those statements and speculated about their source, but did not actually know who made the remark. Juror 1's uncertainty about the nature of the remark and its origin left the district court with a difficult choice: leave the matter alone or press for more information and risk drawing further attention to the remark in Juror 1's mind. Particularly given that Juror 1 was uncertain about who had made the remark and what exactly had been said, the risk of exacerbating the comment's potentially prejudicial effects may have outweighed the benefits of further questioning.
The district court was also best positioned to assess Juror 1's demeanor and behavior during the one-on-one interview, just as it was best positioned to assess the
The cases that Taylor cites—particularly United States v. Davis, 177 F.3d 552 (6th Cir.1999) and United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629 (6th Cir.1998)—are different. In Davis, for example, the court learned that one juror had found out from an outside source that the people in his part of town were aware of the juror's jury service and were discussing the juror's role in the proceedings. 177 F.3d at 556. The court also learned that the juror had shared the information—and his concerns for his safety—with other members of the jury. Id. Rather than investigating the extent to which the out-of-court communication and the juror's unauthorized communications about the case had affected the remaining jurors, however, the district court simply discharged the troubled juror and went ahead with the case. Id. We vacated the Davis defendants' convictions and remanded for a post-trial hearing at which the defendants would bear the burden of demonstrating the existence of jury taint, without which a retrial would not be necessary. Id. at 557. Our holding was based on the fact that the district court had made no inquiry into potential juror prejudice from the improper communications. Id. We relied on the fact that the juror in question "was clearly motivated by fear of retaliation from the defendants," and the "fact that a number of jury members openly agreed that a person in [the juror's] predicament should seek to be removed" from the jury. Id. We also relied on the total absence of a court effort to delve into the extent to which the juror's comments affected the other jurors' deliberations. Id. Neither of those factors is present in Taylor's case. In particular, the district court, at the parties' behest, conducted individualized conferences with the jurors to determine whether they had been prejudiced by the reported remark.
Herndon is likewise distinguishable. There, a juror recalled during the trial that he may have had prior business dealings with the defendant, but the district court declined to investigate—or to allow counsel to investigate—the potential for prejudice arising from those dealings.
Taylor's argument focuses not on the total lack of an opportunity to establish bias, but on the district court's not having questioned the jurors as extensively as Taylor would have liked. He points to United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528 (6th Cir.2000), and Goins v. McKeen, 605 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1979), to support his point, but those cases are distinguishable because the district courts' investigations of potential prejudice plainly fell short of what the law requires. In Corrado, for instance, we remanded for a hearing where, in response to an outsider's attempt to bribe an unidentified juror, the district court merely "directed three broadly-worded questions to the jury as a group and instructed any jurors who [felt they could not remain impartial] to bring themselves to the court's attention by writing a note." 227 F.3d at 536. The district court's "`minimalist' approach," we held, "was an inadequate response to the serious and credible allegations of extraneous influences on the jury in th[at] case." Id. at 535. The jury in Goins was similarly exposed to a prejudicial out-of-court communication—this time a newspaper article containing details of the defendant's plea process, which suggested that the defendant had negotiated to plead guilty to a lesser charge. 605 F.2d at 954. This evidence was "strongly probative of guilt." Id. at 953. Because the communication contained the type of "extremely prejudicial information" that "rendered the circumstances [surrounding a potential verdict] inherently prejudicial," we held that the district court had to do more than merely inquire of the jury—en masse and in open court—whether any of the jurors had been exposed to the prejudicial communication and whether those who had could still be fair and impartial fact-finders. Id. at 954. Here, by contrast, the district court made a deliberate and concerted effort to investigate potential juror prejudice. Not only did the district court question the jurors in camera, one at a time, but it repeatedly asked follow-up questions when the need arose. The district court's efforts here, then, were not at all like the cursory inquiries that were not adequate in Corrado and Goins.
Finally, United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423 (6th Cir.1993), is distinguishable because of the highly prejudicial communication at issue in that case. In Walker, jurors were mistakenly shown portions of a transcript that had not been entered into evidence. Id. at 427. The defendants explicitly requested that the district court allow them to question the jurors about the effect of the transcript on their ability
There is a world of difference between failing to conduct a Remmer hearing and failing to ask a particular question at that Remmer hearing. The former is flatly unconstitutional. But we have never held that a defendant is entitled to resentencing simply because the district court did not incant magic words during a Remmer hearing. All that Remmer requires is that the defendant be given an opportunity to prove juror bias, see Walker, 1 F.3d at 431, not that he be given the opportunity to prove juror bias based on answers to pre-determined questions. Neither Taylor nor the dissent points us to any case holding that a Remmer hearing ceases to function as such if the district court fails to ask any of the jurors a particular question, such as whether a communication affected their ability to be fair and impartial in discharging their duties.
There are good reasons that the law does not flatly require district courts to ask any juror exposed to an out-of-court communication whether the communication biased her. A district court's role in conducting a Remmer hearing is to "determine the circumstances [of the allegedly prejudicial communication], the impact thereof upon the juror and whether or not [the communication] was prejudicial." Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30, 74 S.Ct. 450. Making those determinations necessarily entails consideration of more than just the substance of a juror's answer; it requires a court to evaluate the juror's mannerisms, deportment, tone, delivery, and other elements. The law does not require district courts to disregard those elements in many cases—even when they clearly indicate to the district court that the juror was not biased by the out-of-court communication—and, instead, press forward with questioning in a way that might actually magnify the significance of the prejudicial communication in the juror's mind.
While it probably would have been preferable for the district court to have asked Juror 1 if her knowledge of Taylor's remark affected her ability to be impartial, an arguably questionable decision is not the same thing as an abuse of discretion. The record in this case does not establish that the district court's decision not to inquire further of the foreperson was an abuse of discretion, and Taylor's first claim is accordingly without merit.
Taylor argues that the district court erred in excluding some of the testimony
The context for the excluded proffered testimony is as follows. The Government relied on evidence from both the guilt and sentencing phases of trial to support the non-statutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness. In the guilt phase, the Government presented testimony about Taylor's attempt to escape from jail. Taylor, Marshall, and Matthews were being held in the Hamilton County, Tennessee jail on their federal charges. Taylor and Marshall became involved in an escape plan with three older inmates: Steven Szabo, J.R. Uhuru, and Thaddeus Reed. According to Marshall, Szabo, Uhuru, and Reed told Taylor about their plan to escape, and Taylor told Marshall. The plan was for Uhuru to hit one guard, for Reed and Szabo to restrain two guards, and for Taylor and Marshall to take the guards' radios and keys. Uhuru acquired a length of pipe and flattened it to use to cut through the wire mesh in the cell window. The group also saved sheets and tied them together to use to climb down from their third-floor cells. Taylor arranged for his mother to have a vehicle waiting outside. In his guilty plea agreement, Szabo stated that Taylor was the leader of the conspiracy to escape. In his testimony, Szabo indicated that Uhuru gathered the items needed and punched the guard. During the escape attempt, Taylor helped one of the older inmates hold an officer down. Guards broke up the fight and ordered the inmates back to their cells.
In the sentencing phase, the prosecution introduced a letter that Taylor wrote to Heather Hamilton on September 12, 2008. In the letter, Taylor predicted his conviction would be overturned and wrote: "So many people want to do something to [Marshall]. Next time I go to trial, I bet he won't testify against me. Trust me on that." The letter also described Taylor's methods of identity theft. After Taylor learned that the jail was monitoring his calls and letters, he used another inmate's name to send a letter to Hamilton. Finally, according to FBI Special Agent Melia, Marshall's grandmother or godmother told him that someone tried to break into her house, and that a relative in Taylor's neighborhood had every window broken out of her home.
Taylor's counsel presented James Aiken to testify in mitigation. He stated that he had worked in prisons since 1971. He was warden of a South Carolina prison, worked with the United States Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") and prisons in Indiana, the Virgin Islands, and the supermax prison in Florence, Colorado, and has consulted across the United States. Aiken explained that prisons use internal classification systems to separate the most aggressive members of the prison population from the least aggressive. He told the jury that, in the federal system, officials consider the inmate's age, build, criminal background, medical condition, gang membership, institutional behavior, sentence, and type of crime. Of these factors, the sentence and type of crime are the most important. Aiken predicted that Taylor would go to a high security setting. There would be a gun between Taylor and the public as long as he lives, and he would be accounted for continuously.
The district court subsequently elaborated:
Defense counsel objected.
On cross-examination, Aiken testified that Taylor's behavior while in the county jail would not cause him to be placed in the highest level of security in the BOP. He also testified that even high security federal facilities have escape attempts. On re-direct, Aiken said that the BOP had the most secure facility in the world, which kept total control of every aspect of the inmates' lives, but that Taylor would not be sent to it. If Taylor were sentenced to death, he would be sent to death row at a high security prison. Also, if Taylor were sentenced to life, he would be sent to a high security prison. Aiken explained that escape-prevention security measures at a high security BOP facility include monitoring devices, barriers, and firepower. Inmates are subject to strip searches and their communications are monitored. BOP officers take note of inmates' demeanor, cell contents, telephone calls, and television habits. There are special housing units for those who violate the rules.
Clinical and forensic psychologist Dr. Mark Cunningham also testified on Taylor's behalf. Dr. Cunningham has practiced, researched, and taught psychology since 1983 and written about death row inmates, violence in prisons, and capital sentencing. He has also testified over 200 times in state and federal court. Dr. Cunningham interviewed eleven members of Taylor's family to prepare for his mitigation testimony. He acknowledged that Taylor had a choice regarding his crime, but said that people do not all get the same choices. Factors that stand between a person and bad outcomes include an intact family, acceptance, affirmation, stability, structure, and modeling of positive values. A family history of addiction, psychological disorder, child abuse, abandonment, or instability can lead to bad out-comes.
Dr. Cunningham referred to a 1995 Department of Justice (DOJ) study that
As a child, Taylor had prison visitations with his father up until he was 3. He had no contact with his father again until age 8. In Taylor's middle childhood, his father was open about his criminality and involved his family. Taylor's father's criminal activity included robbery, identification theft, and fraud. He had stacks of cash in his home and handguns in his house and car. Taylor and his brother moved in with their father. Taylor's brother began dealing drugs as a teenager. He accumulated thousands of dollars and gave drug money to Taylor. Dr. Cunningham concluded that Taylor had numerous risk factors that correlate with increased violence and crime.
Dr. Cunningham next discussed Taylor's "wiring." He noted that Taylor was 18 or 19 at the time of the offense, and that the brain continues to develop until the age of 25. Adolescents are prone to both reactive impulsivity and judgment impulsivity. Dr. Cunningham testified that there is a high mortality rate in adolescents because they put themselves in dangerous situations. Young adults' reward centers go "on line" before their braking systems. Dr. Cunningham reviewed the findings of studies on adolescent and young men, which showed them to be much more likely to be violent than older males. The district court sustained the Government's objection when Dr. Cunningham was asked about security levels in the BOP.
The district court permitted Taylor's counsel to proffer testimony by both Aiken and Dr. Cunningham that was not presented to the jury. Aiken said that prisons use classification systems to manage inmate populations by separating violent, predatory inmates from the normal, passive prison population. He testified that he reviewed Taylor's jail records as of January 2008. He said that Taylor would be looked at as prey in prison and would have to be protected until he became seasoned. Aiken stated that, based on Taylor's crime and sentence, incapacitation would be the driving force of his security classification. Aiken said that Taylor would start at a penitentiary and could be placed in protective custody to guard against sexual assault, extortion, gang activity, and contraband.
In Dr. Cunningham's proffered testimony, he said that a capital inmate sentenced to life in federal prison would be sent to a "United States Penitentiary or higher" security level facility. Federal prisons are termed minimum, low, medium, and high security, and there are SHUs within prisons. The most secure facility is a supermax in Colorado. A high security institution has double fencing, gun towers, patrols, perimeter detection devices, and multiple barriers. Dr. Cunningham reviewed the BOP's procedures for dealing with dangerous prisoners. He opined that the BOP can securely house and control inmates. When asked about future dangerousness and rates of violence, Dr. Cunningham testified that the BOP groups inmates by their convictions, personality characteristics, and other means. He cited statistics indicating that, from 2004 to 2005, 94% of prisoners did not assault anyone. There were three homicides in a population of 20,000 inmates. Dr. Cunningham explained that a jury would not know how often violence occurs in the BOP and how effective that system may be in containing violence. He indicated that much of the differences in violence levels system-wide is accounted for by differences in institutions rather than differences in the prisoners. Also, homicide rates are significantly higher outside of prison than inside. Dr. Cunningham also testified that murderers are disciplined less than other inmates and are less likely to be violent in prison. For federal capital offenders sentenced to life, their rates of violence are similar to those of other inmates. State prisoners sentenced to life without parole are half as likely to commit assault. Dr. Cunningham drew three conclusions from DOJ publications: violence in the community is not strongly or consistently associated with violence in prison; a prisoner's current offense, prior convictions, and escape history are weakly associated with misconduct; and the severity of the offense does not predict a prisoner's adjustment to prison.
The district court found that Dr. Cunningham's proffered testimony was far afield from his area of expertise, not relevant, and based on hearsay. The court concluded that the evidence had nothing to do with Taylor and was misleading, confusing, and unreliable. In arguing in favor of admitting the evidence, Taylor's counsel argued among other things that "[m]ost jurors think we're talking about Club Fed. And the only way they can learn the difference is for a man like Mr. Aiken and Dr. Cunningham to tell them the difference."
Rather than relying on oral rulings from the bench, the district court explained the basis for its exclusion of parts of the testimony of Mr. Aiken and Dr. Cunningham in a written memorandum. The explanation is thoughtful, respectful of relevant precedent,
Taylor, 583 F.Supp.2d at 936-43.
There is not any abuse of discretion in this analysis.
The excluded portion of Aiken's testimony was not relevant rebuttal evidence on future dangerousness, because none of it rebutted any of the Government's future dangerousness arguments. At no point in the proceedings did the Government seriously contend—or even intimate—that Taylor was personally dangerous. Indeed, any such argument would have been patently absurd given Taylor's slight stature—something the jurors could not only see for themselves, but on which Aiken remarked at one point during his testimony. The Government made the point even more explicitly during its closing argument:
That the Government neither suggested nor implied that Taylor would be directly dangerous to others while in prison—indeed, the Government did the very opposite—distinguishes this case from Supreme Court cases holding that, when a capital defendant's danger to the community has been raised, but the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the jury must be informed of the parole ineligibility. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), was a split decision in which the operative opinion was the concurrence
Aiken's testimony was similarly irrelevant for purposes of mitigation, since mitigating evidence must bear on the defendant's particular character or circumstances. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 n. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). We have noted that mitigating evidence "includes any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 594 (6th Cir.2000). This statement in Carter relied on language from the Supreme Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), which in turn recognized "the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense." Id. at n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954. As the court below explained, testimony about general prison conditions and the anticipated effectiveness of security protocols is insufficiently individualized to meet that standard.
Taylor cites the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir.2013), to support his contention that the district court should have admitted Aiken's testimony as mitigating evidence. Taylor's reliance on Troya, however, is misplaced. In Troya, the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court erroneously excluded mitigation evidence that "(1) Troya had received his GED, which statistically lowered the rate of risk of violence in prison; (2) Troya's age of 25 lessened his risk of violence in prison; (3) Troya was likely to make a positive adjustment to prison based on his frequent familial visits; and (4) Troya had been safely managed, notwithstanding his escape attempt, during previous stints in incarceration." Id. at 1137. All of that evidence was particular to Troya, inasmuch as it spoke to his "character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
Dr. Cunningham's testimony about inmate classification procedures and prison security was also not proper mitigating evidence, because it consisted almost entirely of the sort of generalized facts that could be said to apply to every death-eligible offender. For instance, Dr. Cunningham was to testify that inmates on death row have a low recidivism rate and are statistically no more likely than other inmates to be dangerous in prison. That testimony is not specific to Taylor's crime or character; the same could be said of any defendant on death row. Indeed, Dr. Cunningham had offered virtually the same testimony in other cases, without regard to the personal characteristics or conduct of the defendant. See, e.g., id. The generalized nature of his testimony makes it an argument against the death penalty itself, not an argument for sparing a particular defendant from the death penalty. Johnson, 223 F.3d at 674. Mitigating evidence must be sufficiently particularized to the defendant on whose behalf it is offered—to his character, his behavior, or the nature of his offense—so as to cause the defendant or his crime to seem less severe or harsh to the jury. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954; Carter, 218 F.3d at 594. Mitigating evidence must, as the name suggests, mitigate the heinousness of the crime or the harshness of the criminal. Evidence about inmate classification procedures and prison security conditions does not fulfill that purpose. For that reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing Dr. Cunningham's testimony on those subjects.
Taylor argues that Jurek, 482 U.S. at 276, 107 S.Ct. 2360, required the district court to admit Dr. Cunningham's testimony so that the jury would "have before it all possible relevant information" on mitigation. But the Supreme Court in Jurek included important limiting language. Jurek does not command district courts to admit as mitigating evidence any information that might conceivably help a defendant's case. Rather, Jurek holds that "[w]hat is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine." Id. (emphasis added). Dr. Cunningham's testimony had nothing to do with Taylor; it was information about the prison population in general. It follows that nothing in Jurek required the district court to admit the excluded testimony. Indeed, Supreme Court precedents consistently emphasized the importance of evidence regarding the defendant in particular, as opposed to whole populations. See, e.g., Zant, 462 U.S. at 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112, 102 S.Ct. 869. Dr. Cunningham's testimony does not fit that bill. This is not to say that statistical evidence like Dr. Cunningham's can never be admissible. Quite the contrary, it can be relevant and admissible in many scenarios. For example, a district court might reasonably consider Dr. Cunningham's summary of BOP studies as relevant evidence to rebut allegations that an individual might be directly dangerous in the future. That, however, was not an
We do not say that the district court was required to exclude the evidence, or even that it was preferable to exclude it. It may be that in the exercise of abundance of caution, a court will permit testimony on behalf of the defendant that the court could properly exclude. The admission of such testimony may be well within the discretion of the district court. But the district court is not an automaton that can only come to one right answer on any evidentiary issue just because the case is a capital case. While reasonable judges may have exercised their discretion differently with respect to the admission of the Aiken or Cunningham testimony, the district court here did not abuse its discretion.
At sentencing, the Government called FBI Agent James Melia to testify about an interview he had conducted with Joey Marshall. According to Agent Melia, Marshall had reported that "about a week or so after the murder," Taylor had said "that his heart couldn't take it anymore, that he had to get out of town, and that he had been robbing drug dealers to try to raise money to get, and stay, out of town." Later on in Agent Melia's testimony, the Government asked him whether he had "any information about whether or not anything's happened to Mr. Marshall's family since he testified in this trial?" Agent Melia thereupon told the jury that Marshall's grandmother had called Agent Melia to tell him that "it appeared that somebody had tried to break into her residence," and that all of the windows in another of Marshall's relative's houses "had been broken out of the house." Taylor contends that Agent Melia's testimony on those points consisted of "vague, unconfirmed, multiple hearsay allegations," and that the district court erred by admitting it.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Agent Melia's testimony about his interviews with Marshall and Marshall's grandmother. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at the sentencing phase of the trial, and accordingly the district court could properly admit hearsay evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 950, 130 S.Ct. 3259, 177 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2010). The only remaining question, then, is whether the district court could have reasonably found that Agent Melia's testimony was relevant and reliable. See Sears, 561 U.S. at 950 n. 6, 130 S.Ct. 3259; Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979). Agent Melia's testimony about Taylor's "my heart can't take it" comment was relevant because it rebutted defense counsel's suggestion, made during the trial's guilt phase, that Taylor's comment evidenced remorse. Agent Melia's testimony was reliable enough because it was based on an official 302 Form that he had completed immediately after interviewing Marshall. That Marshall may have lied in some of his responses to Agent Melia's questioning does not make Agent Melia's testimony about his interview with Marshall or the contents of the Form unreliable. Whether Marshall's statements to Agent Melia were truthful is a question that the jury could properly weigh for itself.
Agent Melia's testimony about his conversations with Marshall's grandmother was similarly admissible at sentencing. In the first place, Agent Melia's testimony
Finally, the district court could have reasonably concluded that the probative value of Agent Melia's testimony was not outweighed by the risk that it would unfairly prejudice, confuse, or mislead the jury. When Agent Melia testified at sentencing, the jury had already sat through weeks of trial testimony and had convicted Taylor of kidnapping and murder. It had plenty of context, in other words, with which to evaluate Agent Melia's testimony. Nothing Agent Melia said during his time on the witness stand—particularly given that his testimony pertained largely to minor offenses—was likely to confuse, mislead, or unfairly prejudice the jury. Accordingly, the district court did not err in admitting the challenged testimony.
There was also no reversible error in the jury instructions. Taylor argues that the district court "unfairly skewed its instructions towards the government, invaded the jury's function, and undermined the jury's consideration of mitigating factors." In its instructions to the jury, the district court briefly summarized the evidence that the Government had introduced to support each proposed non-statutory aggravating factor. The district court refused, however, to enumerate in its instructions each of the thirty-three mitigating factors Taylor had proposed, let alone to summarize the evidence that Taylor had introduced in support of each factor. Taylor contends that, by summarizing the evidence supporting the Government's position on aggravating factors and refusing even to list the factors that Taylor proffered in support of mitigation, the district court's instructions prejudiced the jury toward a sentence of death.
Although the difference in the district court's presentation of aggravating and mitigating factors was questionable, there was nothing confusing or misleading in the terms of the instructions. In the end, Taylor's argument ultimately fails because he has not shown that the district court's instructions actually prejudiced the jury. A jury instruction supports overturning a sentence only if the jury instructions, as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or—most pertinent to this case—prejudicial. Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 496 F.3d 609, 617 (6th Cir.2007). Nothing in the record indicates that the jury was actually prejudiced by the district court's instructions in this case. To the contrary, the record indicates that the jury gave balanced, individualized consideration to each factor—aggravating and mitigating alike. With respect to the Government's three proposed non-statutory aggravating factors, for example, the jury found that the Government had carried its burden with respect to one, but not with respect to two others, notwithstanding that the district court had, in instructing the jury, summarized the evidence supporting each factor. Obviously, then, the jury did not simply accept that every piece of evidence alluded
Likewise, Taylor has not shown that the jury was prejudiced by the district court's refusal to list each of the thirty-three mitigating factors that Taylor proposed. In the first place, the district court's instructions expressly referred the jury to the verdict form, which included a list of all of Taylor's proposed mitigating factors. Jurors, we presume, follow the instructions that they are given, Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001), including, in this case, the instruction to consider carefully the evidence supporting each of the mitigating factors before voting on them. The jury's actual votes on the individual mitigating factors further suggest that the jury gave thoughtful, particularized consideration to each of the factors that Taylor proposed. For example, all twelve jurors found in favor of sixteen of Taylor's proposed mitigating factors, and all twelve jurors rejected twelve of Taylor's other proposed mitigating factors. Differing numbers of jurors—nine, one, two, five, and three—found in favor of the remaining five proposed mitigating factors. The record therefore undermines Taylor's suggestion that the district court's failure to list the mitigating factors caused the jury to devalue those factors.
To be sure, a district court treads on thin ice when it summarizes evidence in instructing a jury, especially when the court does not treat the evidence similarly on both sides of a case. See United States v. Mundy, 539 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2008). That the practice is inadvisable, however, does not mean that it is invariably an abuse of discretion. Because Taylor has not carried his burden of showing prejudice from the district court's descriptions of aggravating and mitigating factors, the district court's instructions do not support overturning his sentence.
Next, Taylor argues that his sentence must be reversed because, at summation, the prosecutor described Taylor in derogatory terms and showed the jury a gut-wrenching photo of Luck's corpse at autopsy. None of the prosecutor's conduct, however, warrants reversal.
During his summation, the prosecutor repeatedly compared Taylor to predatory figures. At one point, for example, the prosecutor said that Taylor "had been stalking this man and victimizing this man for over a year." Later, the prosecutor described Taylor as "a remorseless and relentless hunter," and told the jury that Taylor was "dangerous because he's a chameleon." The prosecutor then alluded to Robert Louis Stevenson's classic short story, telling the jury that Taylor "is dangerous because he always looks like Dr. Jekyll but his mind, his mind, ladies and gentlemen, is always working like Mr. Hyde." The prosecutor followed that comparison by advising the jury that it had "the obligation to be the sheep dog that protects the sheep, and even sometimes the wolves, from the wolf," i.e., from Taylor.
The line between zealous prosecution and prosecutorial misconduct is sometimes a fine one, but on balance the prosecutor did not overstep it here. A prosecutor may not make statements for the sole purpose of inflaming the jury's passions against the defendant. Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668 F.3d 307, 333 (6th
The prosecutor also did not engage in misconduct by comparing Taylor to Mr. Hyde. Nothing in our precedents prohibits the use of literary allusions, particularly not when context makes clear that those allusions serve as near-universally-recognized shorthand for otherwise permissible commentary. There would be no issue, for example, had the prosecutor told the jury that Taylor was "superficially innocent-looking, but constantly scheming and manipulating." Indeed, that very point—that Taylor, a seemingly harmless person, was actually a dangerous man—was related to the Government's argument on future dangerousness and was thus relevant. The prosecutor could make that relevant point by referring to a well-known short story without committing prosecutorial misconduct.
Though close to the edge, it was also not misconduct for the prosecutor to analogize Taylor to a wolf or a chameleon. Prosecutors may use the vernacular to express relevant thoughts. There is no reason, for example, that a prosecutor cannot use "chameleon" as shorthand to describe "a person given to often expedient or facile change in ideas or character." See Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 190 (10th ed. 1997). Moreover, as Taylor concedes, plain error must be shown with respect to the use of these analogies, as defense counsel did not object. The Supreme Court and this court have several times found no reversible misconduct where prosecutors compared defendants to animals or predators of some other kind. For instance, in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-83, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986), prosecutor statements referring to the defendant as an "animal" who "shouldn't be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him" did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. In United States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 577, 588-90 (6th Cir.2010), the prosecutor's description of defendants as "monsters" at the center of a community-wide methamphetamine "epidemic" was improper but not flagrant. In Bedford v. Collins, 567 F.3d 225, 234 (6th Cir.2009), the prosecutor's description of the defendant as a "demon" was unprofessional but did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. See also United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 616 (6th Cir.2008) (prosecutor called defendant a "predator"); United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 142-43 (5th Cir.2012) (prosecutor called defendant a "predator" and compared him to lions and tigers in the jungle stalking animals to kill); Shepard v. Lane, 818 F.2d 615, 621 (7th Cir.1987) (prosecutor called petitioner "a liar," "a dog," and "an animal").
It was also not misconduct for the prosecutor to show the jury a grisly photograph of Luck's corpse. Taylor does not contend that the photograph was doctored, inaccurate,
The photograph at issue was relevant in that it directly rebutted one of defense counsel's closing arguments, namely the argument that Taylor was a better person than the nature of his crime suggested. Defense counsel having made that argument, the prosecutor was within bounds to direct the jury's attention back to the nature of Taylor's crime. The prosecutor did not present the photograph simply for its shock value or for the sake of inciting the jury to reach an emotional verdict. Even if improper, the photograph presentation, as in Wogenstahl, 668 F.3d at 333, was not flagrant. The prosecutor used the photograph to rebut one of Taylor's arguments at sentencing. That was not prosecutorial misconduct sufficient to overturn the jury's verdict in this case.
The district court also did not err, as Taylor contends, by refusing to strike the aggravating factor of future dangerousness in prison. The Supreme Court has held that the defendant's future dangerousness is a consideration on which the State may rely in seeking the death penalty, see Simmons, 512 U.S. at 175, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1002-03, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983)), including death penalty cases where there is no possibility of parole. See id. at 163 (plurality opinion); see also Davis v. Coyle, 475 F.3d 761, 771 (6th Cir.2007). That is what happened in this case.
Notwithstanding the likelihood that Taylor, if not executed, will spend his whole life in prison, the consideration of future dangerousness has clear relevance in this case. As explained above, the Government's future dangerousness argument had nothing to do with Taylor's propensity for physical violence. Rather, the Government argued that Taylor was dangerous because of his ability to get others—inside and outside of prison—to act violently. The district court's refusal to strike future dangerousness in prison as an aggravating factor thus does not warrant setting aside Taylor's death sentence.
Moreover, contrary to Taylor's next argument, the record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could rationally have concluded that Taylor would pose a danger if incarcerated. At trial, for example, the jury learned that Taylor had participated in an attempted jailbreak—involving shanks and sections of piping—in which two guards were assaulted. The Government also introduced evidence from which jurors might reasonably have inferred that, while in jail, Taylor orchestrated multiple acts of vandalism against the family of a witness who had testified against Taylor. Finally, the jury repeatedly saw evidence and heard testimony— including Taylor's own words—showing a lack of remorse on Taylor's part. This included letters stating that Taylor did not mind being in prison, and the recording of a phone call during which Taylor laughed about Luck and Luck's fiancée.
In weighing the sufficiency of the evidence of future dangerousness, we draw all
Similarly, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Taylor engaged in substantial planning and premeditation before murdering Luck—one of the Government's aggravating factors. Taylor's argument on this point is that the evidence shows only that he planned to rob or, at most, kidnap Luck, not that he planned to murder Luck. But the Government introduced several pieces of evidence that support a finding that Taylor planned to kill Luck, not just kidnap him. The jury learned, for instance, that Taylor arrived at Luck's house the morning of the crime not just with loaded guns, but also without any sort of mask or other clothing that might conceal his identity—unlike previous burglaries. The jury could reasonably have interpreted the lack of masks as evidence that this was not just another robbery attempt, and that Taylor had no intent of letting Luck out of the van alive, since Luck could otherwise have easily identified Taylor to the police. While inside Luck's house the morning of the crime, Taylor allegedly observed documentation indicating that Luck was helping to procure a warrant for Taylor's arrest. Most significantly, Taylor drove Luck for two hours to a rural area of a different state, all the while not bothering to conceal his identity. The jury could have reasonably concluded that Taylor's conduct suggested that he intended to kill Luck rather than leave him alive to testify against Taylor in the future.
In rejecting Taylor's argument on premeditation, the district court thoughtfully reasoned as follows:
That analysis is sound.
Taylor's actions after the murder supplied further bases for concluding that he had intended the murder. In particular, the jury heard testimony that Taylor was calm and methodical after killing Luck, rather than panicked or surprised. The jury learned, for example, that, after the murder, Taylor promptly flipped the license plate on his vehicle, took precautions to minimize suspicion while returning to Atlanta, and then went out to eat. The jury could reasonably have interpreted Taylor's conduct as evidence that he expected
Precedent does not require that the Government prove that Taylor planned to kill Luck in precisely the manner that he did. Thus, the fact that Luck's struggle may have prompted Taylor to shoot Luck sooner than he might have intended does not mean that Taylor did not engage in substantial planning and premeditation regarding Luck's ultimate demise. The Government provided sufficient evidence of planning and premeditation in this case, and so Taylor's sufficiency argument fails with respect to that aggravator.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit what defense counsel refers to as "execution impact" evidence—evidence about the impact Taylor's execution might have on his family and friends. The district court, in a written memo, gave several cogent reasons for not permitting such evidence. First, the district court rejected an asserted equivalence between admissible victim impact testimony and so-called "execution impact" testimony:
The district court also noted other problems with such testimony.
Taylor now argues that he had a right to introduce evidence about the "nature and strength of [his] loving relationships with his relatives," on the ground that such evidence constituted "relevant mitigating evidence" under Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(a)(8), 3593(c). He contends that testimony from his family would have constituted "relevant circumstantial evidence of his character, background, and value as a human being." The district court, however, never prevented Taylor's family members from testifying about Taylor's "character, background, and value as a human being." To the contrary, Taylor's family and friends were allowed to testify at length about those subjects. The district court merely prevented Taylor's family and friends from testifying about the impact that his execution would have on them. In so doing, the district court was on firm legal footing. As the Ninth Circuit has observed, there are no cases requiring the admission of "execution impact" testimony, even though some courts have allowed it. Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 891 (9th Cir.2007). The fact that some courts have allowed execution impact testimony does not mean that the district court abused its discretion by finding such testimony irrelevant in this case. For one thing, there are good reasons to believe that such testimony would not properly constitute mitigating evidence. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, "[b]ecause such evidence does not reflect on [the defendant's] background or character or the circumstances of his crime, the Supreme Court has never included friend/family impact testimony among other categories of mitigating evidence that must be admitted during a capital trial." United States v. Snarr, 704 F.3d 368, 401 (5th Cir.2013). Similarly, in United States v. Hager, the Fourth Circuit observed that:
721 F.3d 167, 194-95 (4th Cir.2013).
Taylor argues that execution impact evidence should be allowed to the same extent as victim impact evidence, but these arguments are without merit for the reasons explained by the district court. See also Snarr, 704 F.3d at 402. The district court accordingly did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting execution impact testimony.
Taylor next argues that the district court's instructions to the jury in response to its questions during deliberations were incomplete, misleading, and coercive. The district court gave the jury its sentencing instructions on October 14, 2008. Taylor requested that the district court instruct the jury that, if the jurors could not agree unanimously on a sentence, the district court would sentence Taylor to life in prison. The district court, however, declined to give that instruction. That determination was fully supported by the case law. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 380-81, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999). The instructions that the court gave said that the jury would decide Taylor's sentence, that Taylor would be sentenced to death if the jury unanimously voted for that sentence, and that Taylor would be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release if the jury unanimously voted for that sentence. The district court also instructed the jurors that they should try to work out their differences and should not hesitate to change their minds if they became convinced that other jurors were right, but that they should not change their minds just because other jurors saw things differently or just to get the case over with.
The jury began deliberations on October 15, 2008, then took several days off. Deliberations resumed on October 21. At 11:15 a.m. that day, the jury sent a note to the district court asking: "If the jury cannot reach a unanimous decision, what then?" The court convened the parties and proposed the following instruction:
Taylor objected and requested that the district court advise the jury that if its decision was not unanimous the district court would sentence Taylor to life in prison. The district court overruled Taylor's objection and sent its instruction to the jury. In doing so, the district court reasoned as follows:
The district court thus did not read the jury's question as an expression of deadlock.
At 2:40 p.m., the jury sent out a second note asking whether the case would result in a mistrial and whether the guilty verdict would be "null and void" if the jury could not reach a unanimous decision. After once again convening and consulting with the parties, the district court responded with the following instruction:
Taylor once more requested—and the district court once more rejected his request—that the district court instruct the jury that Taylor would be sentenced to life in prison if the jury failed to reach a unanimous decision. The jury returned its verdict about an hour after it sent its second note.
The instructions that the district court gave were accurate. Federal law allows for just two sentences for defendants convicted of kidnapping resulting in death: life in prison or the death penalty. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). If the jury unanimously votes for either sentence, the district court is to impose that sentence. Id. § 3594. If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the district court is to impose the least severe sentence authorized by law—in this case, life in prison. Id. The district court's initial instruction to the jury—read to the jury before deliberations commenced, and given to the jury, in paper form, at the outset of deliberations—accurately summarized the consequences of a unanimous verdict in either direction. The district court's response to the jury's second question, moreover, properly informed the jury of the consequence relevant to the jury of the jury's failure to reach a unanimous verdict: discharge of the jury without effect on the jury's guilty verdict.
The district court acted within its discretion when it did not tell the jury about the sentence that Taylor would receive in the event that the jury deadlocked. Jones holds squarely that the Constitution does not require the jury to be instructed on the consequences of failure to reach unanimity in a capital case. Jones, 527 U.S. at 383, 119 S.Ct. 2090. The cases that Taylor cites do not require a different result merely because the jury has asked. In Hodges v. Epps, 648 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2011), and Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826 (9th Cir.2001), federal courts of appeals vacated death sentences imposed after lower courts erroneously instructed the juries that the defendants might receive a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole, when, in fact, the minimum sentence for which the defendants were eligible was life in prison without the possibility of parole. Hodges, 648 F.3d at 289; Morris, 273 F.3d at 837. Hodges and Morris thus involved affirmatively inaccurate statements of the law. Taylor, however, does not argue that the district court misstated the law in his case, only that the district court might have offered a fuller explanation. We are aware of no case that requires that a question from the jury be answered with information properly omitted from jury instructions.
It is, of course, possible for a district court to abuse its discretion in delivering jury instructions, even if those instructions are accurate, if the instructions are unduly coercive. There was nothing coercive in the answers provided by the district court, however. This was not a case where the
Even if the district court's answers were considered analogous to an Allen charge, which is questionable in the context of this case, the operative question would be whether, "in its context and under all the circumstances," the district court's jury charge was "coercive." Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965) (per curiam). In this case, the instructions that the district court actually gave were not, under the totality of the circumstances, coercive. In the first place, Taylor points to nothing in the instructions given that either singled out the minority of jurors or encouraged anyone in the jury to abandon sincerely held views of the case. That is one basis for distinguishing this case from United States v. Scott, 547 F.2d 334 (6th Cir.1977), where the district court took the unusual step of telling the jury that failure to reach a verdict would only exacerbate a backlog in cases on the court's docket.
Furthermore, nothing in the jury's instructions even suggested that the jury was required to reach an agreement. To the contrary, the district court's second follow-up instruction clearly explored the possibility of the jury's not reaching a consensus. The jurors' right to continue disagreeing "may be implicit in the charge," see Williams v. Parke, 741 F.2d 847, 850 (6th Cir.1984), and that is the case here.
Accordingly, the district court's responses to the jury questions did not amount to reversible error.
Taylor next claims that the Government did not produce sufficient evidence to convict him of carjacking. To convict a defendant of carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3), the Government must show "that the defendant, (1) with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, (2) took a motor vehicle, (3) that had been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce, (4) from the person or presence of another (5) by force and violence or intimidation." United States v. Fekete, 535 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir.2008). Taking the evidence—particularly Matthews's statements and Marshall's testimony—in the light most favorable to the Government, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the Government had established each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
On appeal, Taylor does not contest that he took Luck's vehicle, that Luck's vehicle had been transported in interstate commerce, that he took Luck's vehicle from Luck, or that he took Luck's vehicle using intimidation. Thus, there is no question as to four of the five elements of carjacking under § 2119. Taylor's only argument with respect to the jury's carjacking verdict is that the Government did not prove that he took Luck's car "with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." Matthews and Marshall, however, supplied ample evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude otherwise. For example, Matthews stated that he, Marshall, and Taylor confronted Luck with weapons and deliberately forced Luck into his van; that Matthews trained his loaded gun on Luck as Taylor got into the van and drove it into Tennessee; and that Matthews and Taylor subsequently shot Luck. Marshall's testimony, moreover, supplied a reason for Taylor to have acted
Taylor argues that carjacking requires the perpetrator to use or threaten force because the perpetrator wants to take possession of the vehicle, and that the Government never established that Taylor and his co-conspirators threatened Luck in order to take Luck's van. Section 2119 contains no such requirement, however. To the contrary, § 2119 requires only that a defendant have acted "with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." We have never imported a "purpose" component into § 2119's specific intent element. Instead, our precedents hold that § 2119's specific intent element is satisfied "if a defendant brandishes a firearm and (1) physically touches the carjacking victim, or (2) there is direct proof that the firearm was loaded." United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d 962, 968 (6th Cir.2013). Matthews had given a statement that he, Taylor, and Marshall "confronted Luck with firearms," including a loaded 9mm semi-automatic pistol, to force Luck into the back of the van. Nothing more is required to find the requisite specific intent under § 2119.
Taylor points to a handful of cases ostensibly supporting his position that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's carjacking verdict, but those cases are distinguishable. In United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (3d Cir.1999), the defendants assaulted the victim, threw his body into his van, and drove away in the van. There was no proof, however, that the defendants threatened or used force to take the victim's van. Id. at 686. The victim was dead when the van was taken. Similarly, in United States v. Harris, 420 F.3d 467 (5th Cir.2005), it was uncontested that the defendant killed the victim and took the victim's vehicle, but there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant had the intent to kill or harm the victim at the moment that he took the vehicle. Id. at 473-75. Neither case, then, establishes any principle requiring overturning Taylor's carjacking conviction.
Taylor next argues that, because juries have declined to impose capital punishment in cases comparable to Taylor's, his sentence is constitutionally disproportionate, particularly where there is no statutory provision for a nationwide-proportionality review of federal capital sentences. No case is cited that supports such a holding. Indeed, the most relevant cases go the other way. The Supreme Court in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984), held that California's capital punishment scheme was not required to have statewide proportionality review; the possibility of state supreme court review was sufficient. The Court relied on its similar ruling in Jurek, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950. In an extensive analysis, moreover, our court has held en banc that the defendant murderer-for-hire could be executed even if the mastermind of the murder was sentenced to life imprisonment by a different jury. Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295, 304-09 (6th Cir. 2007). Taylor's argument in this regard does not require reversal.
Taylor argues that the reasonable doubt standard of proof should apply to the
Taylor also argues that the Government's decision to prosecute him in the Eastern District of Tennessee was prompted by impermissible racial considerations. He suggests that the Government chose that venue because the jury pool in the Eastern District of Tennessee includes a higher percentage of Caucasian jurors than do the jury pools in the other venues where Taylor might have been tried. Taylor's crime involved quintessential interstate activity, and the actual murder occurred in east Tennessee.
Taylor has submitted a prosecutor's acknowledgment in a related case that the Government knew that it was not likely to secure a death sentence for Taylor in the state court system. Ordinarily, of course, there is nothing wrong with the Government's selecting the venue in which the Government is most likely to secure what it believes is a just sentence. Taylor's argument, however, is that juries in the Eastern District of Tennessee were more likely to sentence him to death because the jury pool in that district is made up largely of white would-be jurors. In other words, Taylor theorizes that a jury pool's propensity to sentence black defendants to death is inextricably bound up with the racial composition of the jury pool, so that the Government's selecting the most death-penalty-inclined venue in this case is an inherently race-conscious decision. That, Taylor contends, amounts to a Fifth Amendment equal protection violation.
To show that the Government's venue decision violated his Fifth Amendment rights, Taylor must prove that the Government acted with discriminatory purpose and did so in a way that had a discriminatory effect. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). He has supported neither element with anything other than speculation.
Taylor has produced no evidence that the Government made its charging decision based on the racial composition of the jury pool in any of the venues in which Taylor might have been tried. Prosecutorial decisions are presumptively legitimate, meaning that Taylor bears the burden of proving that the Government purposely discriminated here. At most, the evidence on which Taylor relies indicates that the Government knew that juries in the Southern Division of the Eastern District of Tennessee were more likely to return a death sentence than were jurors in some other jury pools. By itself, however, that fact does not establish that the Government brought the federal charge in east Tennessee because of the racial composition of the jury pool. Taylor's contention in this regard does not warrant reversal.
Taylor's final argument is that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), compels the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), the statute supporting two of Taylor's convictions, is unconstitutionally vague. Because § 924(c)(3)(B) is considerably narrower than the statute invalidated by the Court in Johnson, and because much of Johnson's analysis does not apply to
Two of Taylor's four convictions arose under § 924(j), which authorizes the death penalty where a person violates § 924(c) and causes the death of another person. Section 924(c) imposes mandatory minimum sentences for anyone who uses or carries a firearm during or in relation to a "crime of violence." The statute defines crime of violence as:
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (emphasis added). The jury found that Taylor murdered Luck in the course of committing two crimes of violence: kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), and carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3). At the time of trial, each crime qualified as a crime of violence as a matter of law under § 924(c)(3)(B), the italicized clause above.
Taylor argues that § 924(c)(3)(B) is not materially distinguishable from the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which the Supreme Court invalidated in Johnson as unconstitutionally vague. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2563. The ACCA residual clause is part of the statute's definition of "violent felony," which includes:
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
Johnson does not require reversal of Taylor's conviction, because several factors distinguish the ACCA residual clause from § 924(c)(3)(B). First, the statutory language of § 924(c)(3)(B) is distinctly narrower, especially in that it deals with physical force rather than physical injury. Second, the ACCA residual clause is linked to a confusing set of examples that plagued the Supreme Court in coming up with a coherent way to apply the clause, whereas there is no such weakness in § 924(c)(3)(B). Third, the Supreme Court reached its void-for-vagueness conclusion only after struggling mightily for nine years to come up with a coherent interpretation of the clause, whereas no such history has occurred with respect to § 924(c)(3)(B). Finally, the Supreme Court was clear in limiting its holding to the particular set of circumstances applying to the ACCA residual clause, and only some of those circumstances apply to § 924(c)(3)(B).
There are significant differences making the definition of "crime of violence" in § 924(c)(3)(B) narrower than the definition of "violent felony" in the ACCA residual clause. Whereas the ACCA residual clause merely requires conduct "that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another," § 924(c)(3)(B) requires the risk "that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense." Id. (emphasis added). Risk of physical force against a victim is much more definite
These are distinctions that made a difference in Johnson. The Johnson Court in part relied upon the wide judicial latitude permitted by the ACCA's coverage of crimes that "involve[ ] conduct" presenting a serious risk of injury, language that did not limit a court's inquiry to the elements of the crime. 135 S.Ct. at 2557. Section 924(c)(3)(B), by contrast, does not allow a court to consider risk-related conduct beyond that which is an element of the predicate crime since the provision covers offenses that "by [their] nature" involve a substantial risk that force may be used. The phrase "by its nature" indicates that a court's analysis of whether there is a risk of force is confined to the offense itself. The Supreme Court has interpreted identical language in another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), in this way. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004).
Similarly, § 924(c)(3)(B) does not allow courts to consider conduct occurring after the crime has been committed. In Johnson, the Court explained that "the inclusion of burglary and extortion among the enumerated offenses preceding the residual clause confirms that" a court could evaluate the risk of injury arising after the crime has been completed, since "[t]he act of making an extortionate demand or breaking and entering into someone's home does not, in and of itself, normally cause physical injury." 135 S.Ct. at 2557. Section 924(c)(3)(B)'s requirement that physical force "be used in the course of committing the offense" permits no similar inquiry into conduct following the completion of the offense: under that statute, the force must be used and the risk must arise in order to effectuate the crime. Thus, unlike the ACCA residual clause, § 924(c)(3)(B) does not allow courts to consider "physical injury [that] is remote from the criminal act," a consideration that supported the Court's vagueness analysis in Johnson. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2559.
Another independently compelling difference between the language in § 924(c)(3)(B) and the ACCA residual clause is the textual link in the latter clause by the word "otherwise" to four enumerated but diverse crimes. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2558. The Johnson Court explained that by using the word "otherwise," "the residual clause forces courts to interpret `serious potential risk' in light of the four enumerated crimes—burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives." Id. The Court further explained that gauging the level of risk required was difficult because the four listed crimes "are `far from clear in respect to the degree of risk each poses.'" Id. (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008)). Unlike the ACCA, § 924(c)(3)(B) does not complicate the level-of-risk inquiry by linking the "substantial risk" standard, through the word otherwise, "to a confusing list of examples." Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2561. As a result, § 924(c)(3)(B) does not require analogizing the level of risk involved in a defendant's conduct to burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives.
A third consideration further militates against applying Johnson to this case. In Johnson, the Court recognized its "repeated
Finally, the Johnson opinion itself stressed that its reasoning did not control other statutes that refer to predicate crimes. The Johnson majority addressed at some length the argument that the holding in that case would place in doubt "dozens of federal and state criminal laws[, like § 924(c)(3)(B), that] use terms like `substantial risk,' `grave risk,' and `unreasonable risk.'" Id. at 2561. The Court gave two reasons why that was not the case, and one of them directly distinguishes § 924(c)(3)(B):
Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2561. Unlike the ACCA residual clause, however, § 924(c)(3)(B) does not include "a confusing list of examples."
It is true that Johnson also relied in part on the fact that the ACCA residual clause, like § 924(c)(3)(B), requires the application of a categorical approach, which requires courts to look at the ordinary case of the predicate crime. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557-58. Taylor places primary emphasis on this similarity. But the Court explicitly refrained from flatly invalidating this type of analysis. Id. at 2561-62. In stating that the ordinary case analysis and the level-of-risk requirement "conspire[d] to make [the statute] unconstitutionally vague," the Court ruled that the problem with the ACCA residual clause was that it combined an overbroad version of the categorical approach with other vague elements. Id. at 2557. The same is not true of § 924(c)(3)(B). In short, Johnson did not invalidate the ACCA residual clause because the clause employed an ordinary case analysis, but rather because of a greater sum of several uncertainties. Indeed, as the Court explained, although "the uncertainties in the [ACCA] residual clause may be tolerable in isolation, ... `their sum makes a task for us which at best could be only guesswork.'" Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2560 (quoting United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 495, 68 S.Ct. 634, 92 L.Ed. 823 (1948)).
Recent decisions, in addition, support distinguishing § 924(c)(3)(B) from the ACCA residual clause. In United States v. Amos, 501 F.3d 524, 527 (6th Cir.2007), we noted with respect to language in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) identical to that in § 924(c)(3)(B) that "[t]he clause `used in the course of committing the offense,'
We recognize that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits recently invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) under Johnson's reasoning. See United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir.2015); Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir.2015). Although § 16(b) appears identical to § 924(c)(3)(B) in all material respects, neither decision changes our conclusion, for the reasons given above. Taylor's argument that Johnson effectively invalidated § 924(c)(3)(B) is accordingly without merit.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
A death sentence is "unique [among criminal sentences] in its ... irrevocability," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion), which makes it, of course, the "most severe punishment," Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). For this reason, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" and its protection of human dignity create a "heightened need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Capital punishment "must be limited to those offenders who commit `a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them `the most deserving of execution,'" Roper, 543 U.S. at 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 435, 439, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (holding that human dignity presumes both respect for the individual and a necessity to constrain capital punishment's use). Thus, a death sentence is invalid and unconstitutional if a defendant's crimes "cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more depraved than that of any person guilty of murder." (Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (holding that "the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available").
The "underlying principle that the death penalty is reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders" is implemented throughout the capital sentencing process. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-69, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Sentencing rules thus limit the death penalty to murderers most deserving of execution (in cases of crimes against individual persons), and protect a criminal defendant's rights, including his right to a fair trial. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). The Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) accordingly requires this court to "review the entire record in the case," and
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to criminal defendants the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). Under Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), if a district court learns that a juror has been exposed to an unauthorized communication that may affect the juror's partiality and thereby prejudice the defendant, the court must "determine the circumstances [of the unauthorized communication], the impact [of the communication] on the juror, and whether or not [the communication] was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate." Id. at 229-30, 74 S.Ct. 450 (emphasis added); cf. Maj. Op. 347-48 (omitting italicized language). Remmer thus imposes on a district court two distinct obligations: a duty to investigate allegations of a juror's exposure to an unauthorized communication and a duty to determine whether the exposure violated the defendant's constitutional rights. See United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 535-36 (6th Cir.2000) (stating that "`when there is a credible allegation of extraneous influences, the court must investigate sufficiently to assure itself that constitutional rights of the criminal defendant have not been violated'" (quoting United States v. Rigsby, 45 F.3d 120, 124-25 (6th Cir.1995))); United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1145 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that where "possible juror misconduct is brought to the trial judge's attention he [or she] has a duty to investigate and to determine whether there may have been a violation of the [S]ixth [A]mendment"); see also Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 945 (6th Cir.2004) (observing that "[c]learly established Supreme Court precedent dictates that when a trial court is presented with evidence that an extrinsic influence has reached the jury which has a reasonable potential for tainting that jury, due process requires that the trial court take steps to determine what the effect of such extraneous information actually was on that jury" (internal quotation marks omitted)). "Where a colorable claim of extraneous influence has been raised, . . . a Remmer hearing is necessary to provide the defendant with the opportunity to prove actual bias." United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir.1998) (emphasis added) (internal
Here, after individually interviewing each juror and alternate juror, the district court learned that most had indeed heard the reported "racist redneck" comment. The court thus should have provided Taylor a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias. Because the court denied Taylor's request for a Remmer hearing, it abused its discretion.
The majority cites United States v. Mack, 729 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir.2013), to support its position that district courts are given discretion—as an alternative to a bright-line rule—because "requiring district courts to explicitly inquire whether a juror was prejudiced . . . might actually exacerbate juror bias by `unnecessarily highlight[ing] the [communication] in the eyes of the jurors.'" Maj. Op. 348 (quoting Mack, 729 F.3d at 606). Contrary to the majority's understanding of Mack, we did not there expressly reject a bright-line rule or even approve the district court's decision not "to make an issue of it" so as not to "unnecessarily highlight the matter in the eyes of the jurors." Mack, 729 F.3d at 606. Rather, the court noted the defendant never requested a Remmer hearing and concluded there was no plain error, explaining:
Id.
Unlike Mack, Taylor expressly requested a Remmer hearing, and the district court itself understood that the redneck remark was potentially prejudicial. Because the potentially prejudicial extrinsic communication presented a likelihood of affecting the verdict, this court's precedents required the district court to afford Taylor a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias. Moreover, the majority's concern that further questioning could have exacerbated the comment's potentially prejudicial effect
The majority also distinguishes United States v. Davis, 177 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629 (6th Cir.1998). Noticeably absent from the majority's discussion of Davis is the Davis court's reliance on a third factor: "the fact that the information that prompted the fear was provided by an extraneous source." 177 F.3d at 557. This fact is critical because, as Davis recognized, although "a new trial will not be necessary every time a question of juror partiality is raised[, w]here a colorable claim of extraneous influence has been raised, however, a `Remmer hearing' must be held to afford the defendant an opportunity to establish actual bias." 177 F.3d at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a claim is present here. Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the absence of the two other factors—that the juror was "clearly motivated by fear of retaliation from the defendants" and that "a number of jury members openly agreed that a person in [the juror's] predicament should seek to be removed from the panel," id.—adequately distinguishes Davis. But these were simply the circumstances of Davis; each case will necessarily involve different facts. It does not follow that the general rule that a Remmer hearing is required where a colorable claim of extraneous influence has been raised is not applicable. Moreover, it is not true that Davis relied on "the total absence" of an investigation as a basis for the court's holding that the district court erred in not questioning the remaining jurors. Rather, the total lack of an investigation was the basis of the court's holding that neither the trial court nor this court could determine whether the extraneous communications were harmless. 177 F.3d at 557. Finally, the majority's statement that the district
The majority distinguishes Herndon on the basis that here "the district court asked all of the jurors about the extent to which they were aware of the reported remark." Maj. Op. 350. This characterization of the facts omits the critical fact that the court did not question Juror One (and only Juror One) whether she could continue to serve as an impartial juror. And Herndon suggests it is error to fail to obtain a juror's personal assurance of impartiality when the juror is exposed to an unauthorized outside communication. 156 F.3d at 637 (observing that the trial "judge not only failed to adequately investigate the allegation of juror partiality, but the juror never personally assured the court of his impartiality").
The majority concludes the transcripts of the court's in camera interviews with the jurors "gave Taylor the required opportunity to establish juror bias." Maj. Op. 350. Had the court questioned Juror One regarding her ability to remain impartial, I might agree. In any event, our precedents require a meaningful opportunity to prove actual bias in an evidentiary hearing. See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 536 (holding that "district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing into the allegations of extraneous influences on the jury pursuant to the holding in Remmer" and remanding for a hearing at which the defendant "should be accorded the opportunity to question the jurors individually and under oath"); Herndon, 156 F.3d at 637 (holding that "the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]"); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) ("By denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors' states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias ...."); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (holding that the district court "should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate").
The majority correctly observes that Taylor focuses his appellate argument on the district court's failure to further question Juror One. In other words, Taylor contends the district court failed to discharge its duty to investigate the impact of the outside communication on the juror's ability to continue to serve as a fair and impartial juror. The import of asking the juror whether she could put the comment aside and decide the case based solely on the evidence and law given by the court is not inconsequential. A district court "may rely [on a juror's assurance of continued impartiality] in deciding whether a defendant has satisfied the burden of proving actual prejudice," if the court finds the juror's assurance credible. United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 533 (6th Cir.1984) (discussing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)). But
In United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423 (6th Cir.1993), the district court inadvertently allowed inadmissible portions of deposition transcripts to enter the jury room. Id. at 427. After learning of the mistake, the district court interviewed the jurors individually in chambers and with counsel present to determine how the jury used the transcripts. Id. at 430. The court learned that the jurors did not read the inadmissible portions, but did read portions of testimony the court allowed the Government to show by video (but did not admit as an exhibit) and thus the jury was doubly exposed to the testimony. Id. at 426, 430. The court did not, however, ask the jurors whether the transcripts had influenced their ability to be fair. Id. at 430. Defendants suggested the court inquire of the jurors whether their double exposure would make them believe they could no longer be fair and impartial. Id. The court disregarded the suggestion and provided a precautionary instruction to the jury, directing the jury not to consider the transcripts. Id. at 431. This court held that "[b]y denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors' states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias, and were thereby denied a fair trial." Id. at 431.
The majority distinguishes Walker because, in its view, that case involved a "highly prejudicial communication." Maj. Op. 350. In effect, the majority determines the unauthorized communication here was not prejudicial to Taylor, notwithstanding that the district court denied
Taylor argues that Aiken's and Dr. Cunningham's testimony was admissible to rebut the Government's evidence of Taylor's future dangerousness. The Constitution and FDPA give a defendant the right to rebut the government's allegation of future dangerousness with relevant evidence. See Davis v. Coyle, 475 F.3d 761, 771 (6th Cir.2007) (discussing due process requirements outlined in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986)); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) ("At the sentencing hearing, information may be presented as to any matter relevant to the sentence, including any mitigating or aggravating factor permitted or required to be considered.... The government and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing...."). Taylor also contends the expert testimony was independently admissible as mitigation. (Taylor Br. 110.)
The majority characterizes the Government's allegation of future dangerousness narrowly and concludes that the excluded expert testimony "was not relevant rebuttal evidence on future dangerousness, because none of it rebutted any of the Government's future dangerousness arguments," because, in its view, "[a]t no point in the proceedings did the Government
This characterization of the evidence is unsupported by the record. The jury heard testimony regarding the escape plan, which resulted in injury to two correctional officers and in which a pipe was going to be used against prison officials. (PID 2296, 4313, 4358, 4721, 4734.) The jury learned that Taylor physically "tried to hold [an] officer down" during the escape attempt. (PID 4315, 4359, 4724.) The jury also heard that Taylor took an officer's radio and tried to help another inmate drag an injured officer into a cell. (PID 7316.) The inmate who hatched the plan, J.R. Uhuru, stated that "Rejon did what he was supposed to do." (Id.) Although Taylor may not have injured the officer, the jury could have inferred from the escape attempt that Taylor might physically harm another person while in prison. See United States v. Anglin, 169 Fed.Appx. 971, 975 (6th Cir.2006) (observing that "escape is a crime of violence" in the context of a prison break). Moreover, the majority's narrow understanding of the evidence overlooks the obvious fact that led to his conviction: Taylor killed Guy Luck.
The majority's "unrealistically limited" view of the evidence echoes the same "fallacy" the Supreme Court rejected in Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 254-55, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002). In that case, the Court determined that the South Carolina Supreme Court erred "on the facts" because the evidence and arguments in the case were "flatly at odds with the view that future dangerousness was not an issue in the case." Id. at 253, 122 S.Ct. 726 (internal quotation marks omitted). At Kelly's trial, the prosecutor presented "evidence that Kelly took part in escape attempts and carried a shank, and that he had been caught carrying a weapon
With the proper understanding that "[e]vidence of future dangerousness ... is evidence with a tendency to prove dangerousness in the future," Taylor's experts should have been permitted to testify about the U.S. Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) likely security arrangements to manage Taylor's propensity for violence—whether through direct means or otherwise. Id. at 254, 122 S.Ct. 726. Dr. Cunningham's testimony about United States Penitentiaries' security procedures is relevant to rebut the allegation that Taylor's earlier escape attempt, during which he attempted to physically restrain an officer, indicated future dangerousness. Indeed, as the majority recognizes, "a district court might reasonably consider Dr. Cunningham's summary of BOP studies as relevant evidence to rebut allegations that an individual might be directly dangerous in the future." Maj. Op. 362. In addition, Dr. Cunningham and Aiken proffered that the BOP would monitor and control Taylor's ability to influence other inmates and persons in the public—for example, by monitoring his communications. That testimony is relevant to rebut negative inferences from Taylor's alleged threat against Marshall, his use of other inmates to communicate with persons outside a detention facility, and the alleged damage to Marshall's grandmother's home.
Due process, as well as the FDPA, allows a capital defendant to present to the jury "all possible relevant information" to rebut the future-dangerousness aggravator. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) (plurality opinion); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). The district court thus abused its discretion, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court instructed the jury that the Government introduced evidence pertaining to Taylor's "involvement in an escape attempt" as evidence supporting the future-dangerousness aggravator, but drastically limited Taylor's ability to rebut the allegation. (PID 7766.) The jury subsequently found the aggravating factor "tends to support imposition of the death penalty." (PID 2288.) I would vacate Taylor's death sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
Under the FDPA, a party may present information relevant to establish or rebut any mitigating or aggravating factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 950, 130 S.Ct. 3259, 177 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2010). But such information "may be excluded if its probative value is out-weighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury." 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).
Agent James Melia testified that Inez Marshall (Marshall's grandmother or godmother) called and told him "it appeared
The majority contends the statements are relevant to put Taylor's letter to his girlfriend in context,
The Government does not argue harmlessness in its brief, perhaps because it cannot prove the admission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court instructed the jury to consider "the harm to the home of Joey Marshall's grandmother" as evidence supporting the future-dangerousness aggravator. By allowing the jury to consider the statements, the court in effect inferred for the jury that Taylor could somehow direct crime from prison, although there was no evidence to support such a conclusion. The jury unanimously found the future-dangerousness aggravator and determined that the factor tended to support the death penalty. Thus, the statements likely affected Taylor's sentence.
I agree that Taylor has not shown plain error with regard to his claim of prosecutorial
After analogizing Taylor to Mr. Hyde, the prosecutor argued the following to the jury:
(PID 7755-56.) Although Taylor did not object to this part of the prosecutor's argument and does not raise an issue on appeal, the prosecutor's argument was improper and should not be repeated.
The FDPA requires a capital jury to return special findings regarding any relevant aggravating factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3592, and if the jury does not unanimously find a statutory aggravator, the court must impose a lawful sentence other than death. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d). In this case, the jury found two statutory aggravators: Luck died during the commission of a kidnapping, § 3592(c)(1), and Taylor committed the murder after substantial planning and premeditation to cause Luck's death, § 3592(c)(9). Taylor argues there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of the substantial-planning-and-premeditation aggravator. This court will uphold the jury's verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, "any rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Lawrence, 735 F.3d 385, 415 (6th Cir.2013).
Substantial planning and premeditation relate to the offense of murder, not to the offense of conviction. See United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 325 (5th Cir.1998). The Fourth Circuit defines substantial planning and premeditation as "`a higher degree of planning than would have the
Two years before the crime, Taylor and his codefendants began taking various persons' mail to obtain personal and financial information. They used this information to fraudulently apply for and receive credit cards to purchase electronics, clothes, and other items. (PID 6585-86.) To gather additional personal identification information, they broke into some of the victims' homes while the occupants were away. (PID 6586-87.) They always took with them gloves, wire cutters, and a crowbar. (PID 6589, 6592.) One victim of this scheme was Guy Luck. (PID 6591.) They did not know Luck. (PID 6591.)
While stealing Luck's identity, Taylor learned that Luck owned a French restaurant. (PID 6594.) Marshall and Taylor visited the restaurant, although only Taylor went inside and ordered food. (PID 6595.) Marshall testified that Taylor thought the meal was expensive, which prompted them to question what Luck did with the restaurant proceeds. (PID 6598.) From following Luck, Taylor learned that every night when the restaurant closed, Luck would return home and then drive to the bank in the morning. (PID 6599.) Subsequently, Taylor and Marshall conspired to rob Luck of that money and recruited Matthews to help. (PID 6599-6600.) Both Marshall and Matthews testified that the plan was always to rob Luck and not to murder or hurt him. (PID 6649; App. 141.)
On the morning of the murder, the three went to Luck's house in Taylor's Impala, bringing with them the same tools they use for burglaries, including gloves and wire cutters, but also wielding loaded guns. (See PID 6601-03; App. 140.) The record is unclear regarding who supplied or obtained the guns. Marshall testified that Taylor and Matthews picked him up and the two guns were already sitting in the car. (PID 6600-01.) He added someone gave him the .38 revolver, but could not remember who, and that Matthews took the 9mm pistol. (PID 6602.) Matthews stated that Taylor and Marshall picked him up, and when he got in the car the guns were on the floor. (App. 172-73.)
According to Marshall, when they arrived at Luck's house, Marshall and Matthews got out of the Impala and prepared to confront Luck. (PID 6602-03.) Marshall soon returned to the car because he did not think the circumstances were ideal. (Id.) After discussion, Matthews agreed to hide under Luck's white van in the driveway and wait for Luck to exit his house. (PID 6603.) Taylor and Marshall stayed in their vehicle and rode around the neighborhood, until they noticed Matthews walking Luck back toward the house. (PID 6604.) Seeing this, Taylor jumped out of the car and ran toward the driveway; Marshall drove off, throwing his .38 revolver and gloves into the center console. (Id.)
In contrast to Marshall's testimony, Matthews's FBI interview states that:
(App. 141) (Capitalizations removed.)
Eventually, Taylor and Matthews forced Luck into the back of the van: Taylor got in the driver's seat, and Matthews got in the back to watch over Luck. (PID 6604.) When Marshall drove back around, the white van was at the top of the street, and Taylor signaled for Marshall to follow him. (PID 6605.) Marshall complied with Taylor's request, although he claims that he did not know Luck and Matthews were in the back of the van, and he had no idea what was going on. (PID 6605-06.)
With Marshall following in the Impala, Taylor got on Interstate 75 and drove away from Atlanta. (Id.) After driving 45 minutes to one hour, Taylor pulled over on to the side of the highway and got out of the van to talk with Marshall. (Id.) Taylor gave Marshall his mother's credit card to get some gas for the Impala. (Id.) Marshall asked Taylor what he was doing and where he was going, and Taylor told him he was looking for a place to leave the van. (Id.) According to Matthews's FBI statement, the plan was to leave Luck on the side of the road somewhere far away, so they could get away before Luck reported the robbery. (App. 142)
Before Taylor went back to the van, he allegedly told Marshall, "That's the guy who took the warrant out on me." (PID 6606.) Marshall knew that Taylor had a warrant in Rockdale County, and asked Taylor how he knew. (Id.) According to Marshall, Taylor responded, "I seen some papers in the house that said Rockdale County." (Id.) When searching Luck's house, Detective Dunn found a paper among the piles of documents on Luck's desk that said, "The thieves identified by Matthew K. Wolfe." (PID 4658; App. 124.) That document had the words "Rockdale County" on it. (App 124.)
After Taylor went back to the van, he and Matthews waited in the van, watching over Luck, on the side of the highway. (PID 6607.) Marshall went to the next exit, got gas, and returned to follow Taylor. (Id.) Looking for a suitable place to drop off Luck and leave the van, they drove for another 30 to 45 minutes. (Id.)
They exited off the Interstate, to a rural area in Collegedale, Tennessee. (Id.) According to Matthews, Taylor slowed the van to let Luck out and Matthews got up to unlock the van's side door. (App. 142.) Luck took advantage of this situation and tried to escape: He fought back and jumped on Matthews's back. (Id.) While the van was still moving, Luck supposedly grabbed at Matthews's 9mm pistol, and they began to fight for the weapon. (Id.) Matthews pushed Luck off, and fired one
The van veered off the road and almost crashed into the creek. Taylor and Matthews quickly jumped out. They left their guns and a pair of gloves in the front of the van, and left Luck bleeding out, but alive, in the back. (PID 6607-09.) The.38 revolver had two live rounds left in it. (PID 6510.) A witness who had seen the van veer off the road stopped and asked if everything was fine. (App. 142). Taylor and Matthews told the witness everything was okay, and Marshall pulled up in the Impala to pick them up. (Id.; PID 6608.) Taylor and Matthews ran to the car; Taylor flipped down the Impala's license plate; and they sped back toward Atlanta. (PID 6608.)
The group arrived back in Atlanta, and Marshall dropped Taylor off, then drove home with Matthews. (PID 6615.) Matthews showered and washed off the blood, and Marshall covered the Impala with a car cover. (PID 6615-16.) Taylor told Marshall he would have somebody come by and get the car later. (PID 6615.) When Matthews got out of the shower, Marshall took Matthews's bloody clothing, which he burned the next day, and gave him new clothes. (PID 6615, 6638.) Marshall had a friend drive him and Matthews to the hospital, and later that day, Taylor, Marshall, and two friends ate at Red Lobster. (PID 6617-18, 6623.)
At trial, the Government proposed two theories of Taylor's intent. The first theory was that Taylor, without telling his codefendants, planned all along to kill Luck. The second and more apparent theory is that Taylor originally did not intend to kill Luck when he went to Luck's house, but after seeing the document regarding the identity theft in Rockdale County on Luck's desk, decided then to murder Luck and thereby eliminate him as a witness.
The Government's first theory is wholly unsupported by the record. The second theory, however, has some evidentiary support because Marshall testified that Taylor identified Luck as a possible witness against him based on a document he had seen on Luck's desk. However, assuming Taylor intended to eliminate Luck as a witness by murdering him, he developed that intent while inside Luck's house. Thus, any planning Taylor had completed before that point is irrelevant to whether he substantially planned and premediated the murder. What remains, then, is the nearly two-hour drive from Atlanta to Collegedale.
Without offering a definition of the term "substantial," or providing a single citation to authority, the majority concludes that the Government "provided sufficient evidence of planning and premeditation in this case and so Taylor's sufficiency argument fails with respect to that aggravator." Maj. Op. 369. But, the FDPA requires a finding of substantial planning and premeditation; mere planning and
To support its conclusion that Taylor substantially planned and premeditated the murder, the majority cites four pieces of evidence: (1) Taylor brought guns but not masks to Luck's home on the day of the crime, unlike in his burglaries; (2) Taylor allegedly saw the document regarding Rockdale County on Luck's desk; (3) Taylor drove for two hours; and (4) after the crime, Taylor flipped down the license plate, was calm, and went out to eat at Red Lobster.
First, although defendants had not taken guns with them when they burglarized unoccupied homes, they had not previously planned a robbery. Moreover, the majority's statement that "the lack of masks is evidence that this was not just another robbery attempt" is unsupported. Maj. Op. 368. The majority cites Matthews's plea agreement, which states, "On August 6, 2003, unlike the previous burglaries, the defendants and Taylor brought guns but did not use gloves, masks, and burglary tools as they had before at Mr. Luck's residence." (App. 130.) But Matthews specifically crossed out the word "masks" in the plea document. (Id.) Likewise, at trial, Marshall did not testify to using masks in their burglaries. (PID 6588-90.) Second, although the plea document supports the Government's witness-elimination theory, without more, it does not prove substantial planning and premeditation. Third, I concede the two-hour drive is significant. However, the evidence suggests Taylor killed Luck because Luck struggled with Matthews, thwarting Taylor's plan to deposit Luck—alive—in a remote area so that they could prolong or evade detection and apprehension.
Marshall and Taylor, together, devised a plan to rob Luck. However, both Matthews and Marshall testified there was never a plan to murder, or even hurt, Luck. After Luck began to struggle with Matthews, Matthews shot first, then Taylor shot three rounds toward the rear of the van while driving. Taylor left Luck injured but alive and with two rounds remaining in the revolver. All this suggests a lack of substantial planning. In sum, a juror could not have reasonably found beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor substantially planned and premeditated Luck's murder after viewing the document on Luck's desk.
After oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court held the Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA) residual clause unconstitutionally vague, Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), and we granted Taylor's request to permit supplemental briefing. Taylor argues that because 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)—the statute providing the definition of "crime of violence" underlying his § 924(j) convictions—contains language substantially similar to the ACCA's residual clause, Johnson renders § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague as well.
Section 924(c)(3)(B)'s definition of "crime of violence" is substantially similar to the ACCA residual clause's definition of "violent felony,"
Recognizing that § 924(c)(3)(B) requires courts to use ordinary-case analysis, the majority nonetheless concludes that because § 924(c)(3)(B) is narrower than the ACCA's residual clause, and because "much of Johnson's analysis does not apply to § 924(c)(3)(B)," Maj. Op. 375-76, Johnson does not render § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague. The majority focuses on a number of distinctions between the language of § 924(c)(3)(B) and the ACCA's residual clause that it contends remove § 924(c)(3)(B) from Johnson's scope. See Maj. Op. 376-77. However, to the extent § 924(c)(3)(B)'s language differs from the ACCA's residual clause, the language differences do not render the provisions meaningfully different under Johnson.
The majority first contends that § 924(c)(3)(B) is materially different from the ACCA's residual clause because the language "by its nature" in § 924(c)(3)(B)—in contrast to the residual clause's "involves conduct"—limits the court's inquiry to the elements of the crime. Maj. Op. 376-77. However, a court's inquiry under § 924(c)(3)(B) is no more limited to the elements of the offense
The majority next reasons that unlike the ACCA's residual clause, § 924(c)(3)(B) "does not allow courts to consider conduct occurring after the crime has been committed" because it requires that "physical force be used in the course of committing the offense." Maj. Op. 376-77 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no question that the "in the course of" language is narrower than the residual clause, but this does not make § 924(c)(3)(B) less vague under Johnson's reasoning.
The majority invokes Johnson's concern that "`the inclusion of burglary and extortion among the enumerated offenses preceding the residual clause confirms that' a court could evaluate the risk of injury arising after the crime has been completed, since `[t]he act of making an extortionate demand or breaking and entering into someone's home does not, in and of itself, normally cause physical injury.'" Maj. Op. 377 (quoting Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2257). Thus, the majority reasons, while the residual clause's inquiry is open ended, the § 924(c)(3)(B) inquiry is cabined to risk during the course of the offense. But in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004), the Supreme Court invoked burglary as a "classic example" of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which, as the majority notes, uses the same "in the course of committing the offense" language as § 924(c)(3)(B). And this court analogized escape from a detention facility to burglary in finding the former a crime of violence under § 16(b), focusing on the risk of detection and confrontation,
Further, application of the "in the course of committing the offense" limiting language does not help narrow the application of the "substantial risk" standard to an imagined ordinary case. Section 924(c)(3)(B) still suffers from the indeterminacy this idealized-offense analysis created in the residual clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has taken inconsistent positions on whether the risk of force or injury from burglary arises in the course of committing the idealized offense of after. Compare Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557 ("[T]he inclusion of burglary ... among the enumerated offenses preceding the residual clause confirms that the court's task also goes beyond evaluating the chances that the physical acts that make up the crime will injure someone."), with Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10, 125 S.Ct. 377 ("A burglary would be covered under § 16(b) ... because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing the crime."). Thus, § 924(c)(3)(B)'s narrower language does not render it meaningfully different from the ACCA's residual clause under Johnson.
The remaining distinctions the majority draws between the two statutes do not save § 924(c)(3)(B). The majority notes that unlike the ACCA's residual clause, § 924(c)(3)(B) does not require courts to interpret the level of risk with respect to
Id. at 2561 (first emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Like the ACCA's residual clause, § 924(c)(3)(B) assesses an idealized ordinary case, not actual facts.
The government argues that even if the court considers § 924(c)(3)(B) vague in some cases, we need not find it unconstitutionally vague here because some conduct—including Taylor's—clearly qualifies as a crime of violence. However, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Johnson, stating that the Court's "holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely
Finally, as the majority notes, two other circuits have addressed the issue now before the court in the context of challenges to § 16(b). Rejecting the very distinctions the majority advances, both held the statute unconstitutionally vague under Johnson. See United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 722-23 (7th Cir.2015); Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1114-20 (9th Cir. 2015).
For these reasons, I would vacate Taylor's two convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.
The majority distinguishes Corrado and Goins because the district court here "made a deliberate and concerted effort to investigate potential juror prejudice. Not only did the district court question the jurors in camera, one at a time, but it repeatedly asked follow-up questions when the need arose. The district court's efforts here, then, were not at all like the cursory inquiries that were not adequate in Corrado and Goins." Maj. Op. 350. Although the district court's investigation was not cursory, it was also not complete. The court's refusal to ask Juror One whether she could remain impartial, along with its denial of Taylor's request for a Remmer hearing, deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to prove the juror's impartiality.
476 U.S. at 35, 106 S.Ct. 1683 (plurality opinion). Our adherence to binding precedents is all the more important in a federal cross-racial capital case, as the FDPA mandates that we independently consider whether the jury authorized the sentence of death under the influence of passion or prejudice.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).
The ACCA defines "violent felony" as:
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).